Abstract
Introduction
Union recruitment and organising has been high on trade union agendas across (Gunnigle et al., 2002; CSO, 2008) . While unionisation has remained generally stable and high in the public sector, it has dropped significantly in the private sector. Private sector unionisation is estimated to have fallen to as low as 20 percent . This significant decline in unionisation has occurred despite a benign political context compared to that in Britain, Australia and the US. Despite two decades of social partnership the unions failed to gain any improvement in the legal environment for union recognition in the face of increasing opposition from employers.
The steep decline in private sector unionisation levels has prompted many trade unions to focus on intensive recruitment campaigns targeted at certain groups (cf. Snape, 1994) . For example SIPTU, the largest Irish union, has attempted to recruit from specific groups such as young people, women, atypical workers, workers in multinationals, migrant workers and industries which are considered 'ripe' for union drives (Dobbins, 2003 (Dobbins, , 2004 Higgins, 1999) . To date there has been little systematic study of either the recruitment methods used by Irish trade unions or the relative success of different approaches. Based on a survey of Irish full-time union officials and the methods used to recruit new members this paper attempts to address this lacuna.
Union Recruitment and Organising
Union recruitment activity has been identified as a key factor in the rise and fall of union membership and density (Heery et al., 2000b; Metcalf, 1991; Kelly, 1990) .
Union decline has prompted a shift in the views of unions on issues of recruitment.
Beaumont and Harris (1990) note that unions traditionally believed that union membership growth and decline was dependant on economic and political factors (see also Undy et al., 1981) . This view was reflected in the work of union officials.
Research indicated that most of union officials' time was taken up with negotiation, administration and servicing of members rather than recruitment (Clegg et al, 1961; Beaumont and Harris, 1990; Brown and Lawson, 1973; Robertson and Sams, 1976) .
More recently, explanations that focus on the inadequacies of union recruitment policies have been advanced to account for the decline in union membership such as limited investment in organizing (Voos, 1984) , an unwillingness to attempt organising beyond traditional groups of workers (Beaumont and Harris, 1990; McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994: 41) and the use of ineffective or poorly developed union recruitment techniques (Kelly and Heery, 1994; Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998; Waddington and Kerr, 1999; Waddington and Whitston, 1997) . The renewed emphasis on union renewal through recruitment is generally focused on attempts to make it more strategic and high profile rather than non-specialist, reactive, decentralised and low profile (Beaumont and Harris, 1990) . The emergence of an increasingly strategic approach to the recruitment of new members has been subsumed into a more encompassing generic organising model of union recruitment that seeks to increase membership through workplace activism.
The Organising Model: Theory and Practice
The organising model has been defined as an approach that aims to organise workers so that they are 'empowered' to define and pursue their own interests through the medium of collective organisation (Heery et al, 2000a:38) . The term organising model is essentially a descriptive or heuristic device rather than a model or theory with explanatory or predictive qualities. Indeed, literature on organising has failed to develop a definition of it and it is difficult to 'pin down' a definitive set of measures of the organising model. Discussions on the organising model have centred on the practices it encompasses and the outcomes it is supposed to produce. It is an encompassing label used to describe a an extensive range of union practices ranging from direct recruitment methods to political and community activism (see Appendix 1 for a list of organising practices as identified in literature). The outcomes of using these practices are argued to be an increase in new members and increased activism amongst members so that they handle disputes thereby reducing reliance on paid union staff (Dundon et al., 1999; Oxenbridge, 1997; Fiorito, 2004) . In theory, the increased involvement of lay representatives and shop stewards facilitates a more efficient use of union resources and increases democracy within the union (de Turberville, 2004 ).
The organising model is contrasted, usually favourably, to the more passive servicing model of recruitment. A service model of trade unionism is one where the function of the union is to deliver collective and individual services to members provided by the formal organisation and its hierarchy of officers (Heery et al., 2000a:38) . Thus, under the servicing model, the responsibility for union resources, strategies and interests, handling grievances and recruitment rests primarily with union officials (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998; Carter and Cooper, 2002) . Critics of service unionism argue that it is disempowering for union members because union tactics such as legal cases can be remote from members' workplaces (cf. Crosby, 2002) . Alternatively, it could be argued that the threat and outcomes of individual legal cases can be used by unions to encourage collective action (McCammon, 2001; Colling, 2006) . Thus servicing and organising are not necessarily mutually exclusive (see Fiorito, 2004) .
Despite the advocacy of organizing methods of building activism from the grass-roots up to ensure long-term membership stability, the uptake and successfulness of the model to date has not been extensive (Oxenbridge, 1997:26) . There have been a small number of publicised campaigns in the US based on the organising model (cf. Hurd, 1993; Waldinger et al., 1998) . According to Bronfenbrenner and Hickey (2004:17) , these high profile organising victories have been concentrated in a few unions and industries, "while the majority of unions in the US continue to experience organizing losses and declining membership". In a survey of union officials in Britain, Fiorito (2004) found that roughly half of the sample indicated that their unions were adopting the organising model. From their research, Heery et al (2000b) concluded that British unions were selective in the use of the organising model practices and that there was no major organizing union dedicated mainly to the extension of union organization.
Various reasons have been advanced for the relatively low uptake and poor adoption of the organising approach. Firstly, the organising approach requires significant investment yet not all unions ascribing to organising have provided the necessary resources (Voos, 1984; Snape, 1995; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; Carter and Cooper, 2002) . Indeed, the increased workload associated with implementing an organising approach without the concomitant resources has been a source of frustration for union officers (Heery et al., 2003b; Fiorito, 2004; Carter and Cooper, 2002) . Secondly, a number of studies have pointed to the influential role of union leaders in the adoption and success of union renewal strategies (Fiorito, 2004; Oxenbridge, 1997; Voss and Sherman, 2000; Kelly, 1998; Carter and Cooper, 2002; Griffin and Moors, 2004) . While insufficient resources may signal a lack of commitment to organising, conversely an overenthusiastic leadership is not a guarantee of success. Union leaders, who impose a top-down approach to organising without the necessary buy-in from union officials, militates against the democratization that is supposed to be an output of organising and can result in the failure of the organising approach (Carter and Cooper, 2002; de Turberville, 2004 ).
Thirdly, scepticism or even opposition to the organising approach can be related to union officials' belief in the servicing model. While the intention of union leadership may be to move away from servicing to organising, advising and representing individual members still remains a significant part of a union official's job (Colling, 2006; Heery, 2006; Higgins, 2008; Snape, 1994) . For example, Carter and Cooper (2002) noted that officials surveyed in the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (MSF) in Britain were unhappy with the characterization of servicing as valueless and organising as 'good' and also with the belief of key national officials that it was possible to change practice overnight. The overwhelming conclusion of officers from the MSF study was that organising was simply an addition to existing practice, rather than an attempt to transform it. Thus, union officials' own commitment to organising can be influenced by their belief in organising, the process in which union leadership introduce the approach and the resource provision attached to it.
Methodology
These criticisms aside there is some limited evidence that the organising model enhances the recruitment of new union members (e.g. Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; Erickson et al, 2002) . This paper explores the recruiting and organising methods used by full-time union officials in the private sector. A postal survey of officials was carried out in eight Irish trade unions. The unions were selected on the basis that their membership was either wholly or partly drawn from the private sector. Upon request from the authors, all of the unions selected granted full access for the study. (Dundon et al, 1997; Oxenbridge, 1997) are a function of different organising methods and techniques (Heery et al, 2000a; Carter and Cooper, 2002; Oxenbridge 2000 ) that are in turn influenced by a number of factors such as necessary resources (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; Heery et al, 2003b) , support of union leaders (Kelly, 1998; Fiorito, 2004) and union officer commitment (Colling, 2006; Heery, 2006) .
Based on this survey we first test whether the greater use of organising methods is associated with organising and recruitment success (Fig I) . Secondly, we test the various factors that influence union officers' choice of recruitment methods. As noted above union officers with a heavy workload and scarce resources are less likely to favour the organising model. A central influence on the choice of tactics will be the extent to which their union is committed to recruiting and organising new members. It is also likely that a union officer's personal commitment to recruiting will affect the choice of organising methods. Other factors in the Irish context influencing organising are likely to be the difficulties of union recognition and employer opposition. During the 1990s there was a sharp rise in the number of union recognition recommendations from the Labour Court and the number and intensity of strikes related to union recognition. In those cases where the Labour Court recommended recognition of the trade union, few of the companies involved acted on the recommendations (Gunnigle et al, 2002) . Employer opposition to trade unions also appears to have increased during the period of social partnership with union officials reporting an increase in the use of coercive tactics by employers (McMahon, 2001; Turner, 2005 and . Employer opposition raises the costs and difficulties of recruiting new members. Unless adequate resources are provided, union officers may prefer to avoid involvement with recalcitrant employers. Similarly union officers are more likely to favour recruiting in traditionally unionised sectors such as manufacturing. Thus, we include work load, personal commitment to recruitment, union commitment to recruitment, employer opposition and the sector covered by the union officer. It may also be the case that the above factors have a direct influence on recruitment outcomes. In addition it might be expected that younger union officers, less socialised into the service model than older officers, will be more likely to adopt the organising model of union recruitment. A potential limitation in testing the organising model is that we assess the model through one narrow perspective -that of full-time union officials. 
Description of measures
As the organising approach is central to the research questions here it is essential to grasp something of its content. Based on the list in Appendix 1, we identified two dimensions of organising and the measures of these dimensions are outlined in table 1 with means and standard deviation. The first dimension is oriented toward building organisational and members' capacity to engage in union activity. Organising capacity is composed of five items ranging from encouraging members to be active, supporting and training lay representatives, building collective organisation and setting up an organising committee. The second dimension of organising is designed to build the recruitment capacity of the union through member and lay-activism.
Recruitment capacity is composed of seven items to include encouraging recruitment by lay activists, person-to-person recruitment and use of community organisations (Table 1) Composed of 3 items: How much autonomy do you believe you have with regard to the following activities: 1.Deciding which workers to recruit; 2.Choosing recruitment methods; 3.Selecting targets for recognition. Item scored 0=none; 1=some; 2=moderate; 3= a great deal. Composite range 0 to 9.
1.5 Experience of employer opposition
Starting with the most 4 recent case you were involved in, did the employer oppose recognition. Scored 0=No cases opposed; 1=25% cases opposed; 2=33% cases opposed; 4=50% cases opposed; 5=66% cases opposed; 7=75% cases opposed; 8=all cases opposed. Mean based on a 0 (no opposition) to 1 (all opposed) score. 
1.02
Work load How many union members do you currently have direct responsibility for? Scored: 1=100-1000; 2=1001-2500; 3=2501-5000; 4=5001+. Composed of 7 items: 1. Identifying sites for union recruitment (q3); 2.Encouraging recruitment by lay activists (q3); 3. Person-to-person recruitment at the workplace; 4. Link up with community organisations; 5. Corporate campaigning (eg contacting shareholders to encourage recognition); 6. Direct recruitment by activists at other workplaces.7. Rating of potential members in terms of likelihood of joining the union (mapping). Scored 1=not used; 2=used rarely'3=used occasionally; 4=used frequently. Composite range 7 to 28.
2.8 Organising model (Alpha=0.4)
Composed of 2 items: organising capacity and recruitment capacity 31.2 3.7
Dependent measures Membership numbers
Over the past three years has union membership amongst the workers for whom you have responsibility changed: scored 1=Decreased by 10% or more2=Decreased by less than 10% 3=Stable level of membership; 4=Increased by less than 10%; 5=Increased by 10% or more.
1.2 New members
Over the past three years has recruitment of new members amongst the workers for whom you have responsibility changed: scored 1=Decreased by 10% or more2=Decreased by less than 10% 3=Stable level of membership; 4=Increased by less than 10%; 5=Increased by 10% or more. 
Multivariate analysis
Based on the model outlined above we first explore the factors that determine the use of an organising approach. The dependent measures are organising capacity, recruitment capacity and the organising model combining the two measures. As table II indicates, the regression equations are not statistically robust and are only significant at the 10 percent level (F score). Indeed, significance at the ten percent level was only achieved by reducing the number of control variables in the equations.
Furthermore, the variance explained in the dependent measures is relatively low at between six and eight percent (adjusted r 2 ). These qualifications aside occupational coverage is significantly (at the 10% level) associated with organising capacity (equation 1) though not with recruitment capacity or the full organising model. This indicates that the greater use of organising methods is more likely where union officials cover members in higher level occupations. The commitment of the official to recruitment is strongly and significantly associated with increased use of recruitment capacity methods and the combined organising model (equations 2 and 3).
Thus the higher the commitment level of officials the more likely they are to use recruitment capacity methods and the overall organising methods. Essentially this is the only robust association that can be drawn for table II. Ns =not significant * P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01
In table III 
Discussion and Conclusion
Based on a survey of union officials this paper tested the relationship between various factors such as commitment to recruitment, employer opposition, membership/occupational coverage and union officers' choice of recruitment methods. Secondly, we test whether the use of an organising approach is associated with organising success as measured by changes in levels of membership and newly acquired members. In the former case we found only a weak relationship between the commitment level of officials and the use of organising methods. In the latter case the use of organising techniques by the officials surveyed had no significant impact on changes in membership numbers. However the greater use of the organising model by officials had a significant and positive impact on reported changes in new members.
Yet the variance explained by the use of the organising approach was extremely modest. Indeed, the results here give relatively scant support to the advocates of the organising approach to union recruitment. It may of course be the case that the specified model and measurements used here fail to provide an adequate test of the effectiveness of the organising model. This tends to be a perennial problem with survey based research and its inability to capture the rich texture of everyday social processes. Clearly our data and methodology reflect the general weaknesses of this approach. In addition, as our findings are based on the experiences of full-time union officials, an area for future research would be to capture the attitudes and experiences of local activists of putting the organising model into practice.
Using the interpretations of union officials, the theoretical weakness of the organising model is apparent. In practise union organising and servicing activities are likely to overlap, contributing to the difficulty in defining the boundaries of the organising model. In addition, some of the practices included in table 1 could be categorised as traditional recruitment such as planned organising campaigns and paid lead organisers. Thus during a 'recruitment' campaign it may be difficult to distinguish where traditional recruitment ends and organising begins because the organising model fails to indicate how the organising process works and '…fails to show any clear path from internal mobilization to external organizing ' (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998:44) .
As our review of the literature suggests the organising model as a construct lacks definitional and conceptual rigour. In the absence of such rigour it is difficult to develop appropriate empirical measures of the dimensions that constitute the organising model (Gorz, 2005) . There are also questions regarding the ambiguousness of the objectives of the organising model (de Turberville, 2004) . Many of its advocates emphasise that the organising model's primary objective is not to recruit members but to foster activism and organising (cf. Carter, 2000; Heery et al., 2000a) .
Recruiting members then becomes an indirect outcome of organising. In unionised workplaces it may be that organising will lead to the recruitment of new members.
However in firms where no union is established recruitment of union members would appear to be a necessary first step to create the conditions for an organising drive. In practice the organising model amounts to a collection of tactics and techniques defined more by their extent and intensity i than any qualitative difference from the long activist tradition in Irish and British trade unionism (Newsinger, 2003; Heery and Kelly, 1990 ). Yet activism such as participating in union affairs, canvassing for new members and commitment to the principles of trade unionism has always been confined to a critical minority of union members, in particular lay and full-time union officers and shop stewards (Flood et al, 1996; D'Art and Turner, 2002; Heery and Kelly, 1990) . Full-time union officials are generally appointed after many years of shop floor activism and tend to be highly committed trade unionists.
The demands of the organising approach require great commitment in terms of time, enormous energy and the confrontation of often hostile employers. Unless substantial extra resources are available, it is unlikely that union officials would be able to sustain the 'permanent' activism required by the organising model. Organising campaigns are also costly and there is a limit to the scarce resources of trade unions. Clearly there are also political avenues to increasing the membership and density of trade unions as well as organising campaigns by individual trade unions. Historical trends in union membership numbers and density across the developed industrial societies reflect in the main political and institutional developments rather than the extent or intensity of workplace activism and organising (see also Western, 1997) . For example the high union density levels in countries such as Sweden and Denmark derive from political conditions that created a relatively benign institutional environment supportive of union membership and collective bargaining. Nevertheless employer hostility and weak institutional support from the state would appear to make renewed attention on organising and recruiting workers an imperative for Irish trade unions.
